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The China-India relationship is set to become one of the most significant economic ties 
of the coming decades. Bilateral trade between the two countries has jumped from US$3 
billion in 2000 to US$69 billion in 2012. In the same year, China became India’s 
second-largest trading partner, after the United Arab Emirates. In turn, India was China’s 
twelfth-largest and fastest-growing trading partner. Yet, direct investment remained 
minimal. However, for adventurous corporates seeking to do business in either country, 
the question for their strategists, advisors and investors becomes not, “Will you succeed?” 
but “Can you afford to fail?”
In many cases, pioneering companies from India entering into China and vice versa, 
are operating outside their comfort zones and are being forced to innovate and adapt 
their processes and strategies to succeed. The lessons learned, many of which have been 
identified in The Silk Road Rediscovered, a book I co-wrote together with Professor Anil 
K Gupta and Haiyan Wang ,i can help pave the way for others and encourage multi-national 
enterprises (MNEs) in the U.S., Europe, Japan and other countries to brave the waters 
in these economies which, to date, have been negotiated with trepidation. 
By Girija Pande
China is changing 
substantively, and the 
evolving structure of 
the Chinese economy 
along with its growing 
consumer movement 
will result in the 
country becoming 
much stronger in the 
services sector.
With India and China’s economic ties 
no longer defined only by trade, the 
countries’ convergence is opening 
up new opportunities and challenges 
for businesses on either side seeking 
to cross the Sino-Indian border.
The re-visioning of the Silk 
Road in the 21st Century
PARtInG shot
It’s not will you succeed?
but can you afford to fail?
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the economies will converge
I do believe that Indian companies can succeed in China, and conversely—and they must. 
While India still lags in infrastructure, the country does, of late, boast of strong leadership. 
If Indian firms decide to enter China, they would no longer be inhibited by the infrastructure 
weaknesses of India. Similarly, the Chinese would love to build their business in India. 
Their leaders recognise that the Indian economy is growing rapidly, and have publicly 
accepted that the trade ties in China’s favour need to be more balanced. We therefore 
forecast that Chinese investments in India will hit US$30 billion in 10 years’ time.
But while it is commonly said that there is complementarity between the two economies—
with China being the manufacturing capital of the world and India acting as the back office 
of the world—we argue in the book that this is not the way it will continue in the future. 
China is changing substantively, and the evolving structure of the Chinese economy along 
with its growing consumer movement will result in the country becoming much stronger 
in the services sector. Moreover the fast increasing cost structures and slowdown in the 
size of the labour force will require China to vacate certain areas in manufacturing. As for 
India, I expect that once its infrastructure investment takes root, the well-educated and 
low-cost labour force, along with the growing scale of market, will result in a strengthening 
of its manufacturing sector—more so for exports.  
Hence, over a ten year time frame, both countries will go into manufacturing and 
services—and that represents convergence, not complementarity. 
Although the challenges and strategies are similar, and most of our argument is 
symmetrical and applies to companies in both countries, I will focus here largely on one 
side: that is about Indian companies entering China.
I believe that the 
biggest stumbling 
block in the 
relationship between 
the two countries 
developing further is 
the current mind-set—
particularly on the part 
of Indian executives.
challenges and 
strategies for Indian 
companies to operate 
in china
I believe that the biggest stumbling block in 
the relationship between the two countries 
developing further is the current mind-set—
particularly on the part of Indian executives. 
Let me elaborate. If you look at China, it has 
historically had varying degrees of border 
issues with its neighbours—Korea, Japan, 
Taiwan, Vietnam, Mongolia, Russia, Hong 
Kong and India. (And that’s not a surprise—so 
does India—big countries do have this 
challenge). But these East Asian countries, 
other than in South Asia—including India, 
have managed to deftly separate political issues 
from business issues, and remain large trading 
partners with China. While I do not expect 
the Indians to forget the boundary and other 
disputes with China, I argue that this should 
not come in the way of sound economic 
cooperation. The age-old geopolitical tensions 
between China and India are not likely to be 
resolved in a hurry, but the economic 
relationship between the two countries needs 
to take centre stage. Over the next decade, 
cross-border investments between China and 
in India are likely to grow even faster, both 
organically and indirectly through third-
country acquisitions. 
The other major issue with the Indian 
mind-set is the lack of confidence in the 
corporate headquarters of Indian 
companies, which do not believe that they 
can really build a large and sustainable 
business in China, given factors such as its 
size, diversity and language barriers. Hence 
the first step an Indian company would need 
to take would be to ensure that they ‘Think 
Global’, not just ‘In-China-For-China’ 
when entering China. Potential investors 
need to look carefully at how the move will 
fit into their global strategy. Besides looking 
at the competitive advantages they can gain 
by leveraging their distinctive competencies 
(whether it is technology, organisational 
capabilities, corporate reputation or global 
relationships) in the new market, business 
leaders need to consider the ways in which 
a move into China will bring added benefits 
to the company outside the host country.
Companies can reduce 
the risk of failure by first 
targeting a very clear 
and narrow beachhead 
market segment.
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CHINa: vaSt aNd dIverSe, 
aNd CHaNgINg raPIdly
I always advise Indian companies not to 
say that they are building a business in 
China, but that they are building a 
business in a specific province such as 
Guangdong or Shanghai because China 
is not only an extremely large country in 
terms of geography, population and 
economy, it is also very diverse. You have 
to look at it regionally. For instance, the 
per capita income on average in say 
Shanghai or Beijing is seven to eight times 
that of those residing in the poorer 
western parts. This wide income disparity 
means that the customer profile will also 
vary widely, and adds complexity to an 
already unknown environment. The 
company thus has to be very flexible and 
adapt its products and services not just 
for ‘China’, but also for its different 
provinces and cities. 
At about US$9.3 trillion, not only is the 
size of the Chinese economy substantially 
larger than the Indian economy at around 
US$1.6 trillion (2013), it is also growing 
more rapidly. And this gap only continues 
to increase. The rate of change is much more 
rapid in China than that to which Indian firms 
are accustomed. This means that consumer 
behaviour and industry structure are 
changing constantly, and represents an 
unstable situation where the economy is 
growing at a rate that the world has never 
seen, and where businesses must adapt 
to this rapid change in an incredibly 
vast country.
Companies can reduce the risk of failure 
by first targeting a very clear and narrow 
beachhead market segment. For instance, 
when the Mahindra group ventured into 
China, it did not go into a broad automotive 
sector, but instead focused on small farm 
machinery recognising that China, like India, 
had small land holdings. The product mix 
was thus adapted to the social and business 
climate of small farms.
Another way of reducing the uncertainty 
is to learn as much as possible about China 
before entering the market, by say, attending 
relevant seminars, and learning from others 
and their mistakes. It can also be extremely 
helpful to ensure that the team that goes 
in—particularly the leaders—is well 
experienced in China. At Tata Consultancy 
Services (TCS), for instance, only expatriates 
with China or Taiwan experience were sent 
in as senior managers. Similarly, Mahindra 
hired someone from Unilever, who had 
worked several years in China, to set up and 
lead their business. 
brutal ComPetItIoN
Almost every multinational company in the 
world is in China—though not as yet in India. 
China has a rather pragmatic view that these 
companies will, at the very minimum, 
contribute to building the infrastructure 
and creating jobs, but the Indians tend to 
get more nationalistic and bogged down by 
the concerns of having a foreign company 
on their land. As a result, competition in 
China is generally far more intense than 
what the Indian companies would have 
faced. And it is not only the multinationals, 
but also the booming Chinese private sector 
with its host of small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) with which foreign firms must 
contend. And finally, there are the state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), many of which 
do not look at margins, but go for volume. 
Typically, SOEs are not listed, and have a 
much longer horizon for returns on 
investment than the Indian companies, 
which look at capital very differently with 
quarter-to-quarter targets. Hence, the 
company needs to have a very clear strategy: 
looking at China with a global lens and 
recognising the global capabilities that it 
brings and which will differentiate it from 
these competitors. 
Provinces too, are often competing 
fiercely with one another to bring in 
investment—and this can prove to be a great 
boon to firms ahead of deciding where to 
establish operations. 
US$9.3 
trillion
US$1.6 
trillion
Chinese economy (2013)
Indian economy (2013)
Almost every 
multinational company 
in the world is in 
China—though not as 
yet in India.  
SafeguardINg INtelleCtual 
ProPerty wHIle INNovatINg
Historically there have been concerns 
about the protection of intellectual 
property (IP) in China. While laws do exist, 
enforcement has not been consistent and 
in line with best practices. But we argue 
that this will soon lessen as a key concern. 
Since China became a member of the 
World Trade Organization in 2001, and 
particularly over the past four to five years, 
Chinese companies and the Chinese 
government have realised that the days of 
low-cost mass production are over. They 
can no longer compete on those grounds 
given the changing cost structure and the 
strengthening currency. They have 
understood the significance of competing 
through the creation of new ideas and 
therefore recognise the need to respect 
IP. Today, Chinese companies such as 
Huawei are some of the biggest filers of 
patents. And to safeguard those patents, 
they are now suing one another; the end 
result being that some of the most heated 
discussions in the IP arena are now 
between the Chinese themselves.
But cross-border investments are not 
just about growth. Companies moving into 
China get a chance to share knowledge and 
to adapt and innovate—creating unexpected 
products and opportunities along the way—
and at least some of these innovations are 
likely to be globally relevant. This type of 
benefit is illustrated well by the case of NIIT 
in China (refer to Box 1).
taleNt maNagemeNt: 
aCquISItIoN, eNgagemeNt 
aNd develoPmeNt 
A major worry of doing business in China is 
the high levels of attrition. Turnover rates 
among professional staff can be as high as 
20 to 40 percent a year. There are two key 
reasons for this. First, the kind of growth 
rate that China is witnessing has resulted in 
huge opportunities across industries and 
services. And second, the average Chinese 
worker has changed over the past couple of 
decades: China’s one child policy has created 
princelings, who are far more individualistic 
and demanding than previous generations. 
Hence, retaining these individuals and 
managing their careers becomes a real 
challenge. In TCS, if employees did not get 
a promotion every 18 months, they typically 
started looking elsewhere for other options. 
It is therefore important for managers 
to make sure that employees are well-
compensated and in line with the market. 
Deferred compensation, such as stock options 
and employee loans, are some other ways that 
could work to effectively retain employees. 
bOx 1: INDIA’S NIIt IN ChINA
Global IT learning and out-sourcing company NIIT’s unique “Inside” business model was incubated in China 
after the company’s journey into the country took a surprising path. NIIT entered China in 1997, when information 
technology was still a nascent industry. After some difficulty getting a license, the Shanghai Education Bureau 
agreed to a 10-year contract teaching at just one centre in Shanghai under tightly controlled conditions. The 
interest from potential participants was immediate and unexpected, with newspaper advertisements prompting 
more than 2,000 applications for the company’s first two- to three-year courses.
For NIIT’s leadership team in China, this was a period of massive learning on all fronts, not least on how to protect 
their intellectual property. They hired 14 professors to translate the textbooks, breaking each into 14 parts and 
giving a different part to each professor. Innocuous but deliberate mistakes were made in course materials so 
that copies could be easily identified, and the marketplace was policed closely to keep track of pirated logos, 
text material or even fake NIIT centres that showed up. Adaptions were also made in teaching techniques and 
for remunerating staff.
After a successful first year, NIIT was given permission to expand. However, difficulty obtaining licences from other 
city governments forced them to rethink their usual models. Instead of going it alone, the company began 
signing up universities and colleges as franchisees, which meant that as well as having the necessary licences, 
the universities had existing infrastructure, so no new investments were necessary. It didn’t take long before the 
universities came up with the idea of embedding the NIIT curriculum in their bachelor’s degree programmes—a 
win-win situation—which eventually became the NIIT Inside model, an idea they have since taken back to India. 
NIIT has thrived in China, and as of 2013, it was training over 30,000 IT professionals a year at more than 140 
centres, and had signed a memorandum of understanding with the Hainan Government for a multi-year 
large-scale talent development project.
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braNd reCogNItIoN
For an Indian company wishing to enter or 
expand in China, brand recognition will be 
a challenge. Hence the choice is either to 
acquire a well-known third-party brand, like 
Tata Motors did when they acquired Jaguar 
Land Rover, or build it. A key difference is 
that when a brand is built in India, it is 
essentially being done for the firm’s 
customers and its employees; but in China, 
the brand has to be built for the government 
as well. Because in China, the government 
is omnipresent—and if it believes that the 
firm has a strong reputation and is socially 
responsible—then brand-building becomes 
far easier. 
uNderStaNdINg 
goverNmeNt relatIoNSHIPS
It follows that any firm operating in China 
must understand the importance of the 
government at every level. While the state 
(particularly at the province level) heavily 
promotes investment, the fact is policies do 
tend to change. The mayors typically enjoy 
considerable autonomy in decision-making—
but this does not mean that approval at their 
level implies unanimous agreement across 
other states and government functionaries. 
Hence the company has to keep abreast of 
developments and understand these nuances 
while navigating the political landscape.
deCIdINg wHetHer to 
PartNer or Not
My view is that while a firm may still manage 
‘China for the world and China for the region’ 
on its own, ‘China for China’ is another issue 
altogether. There is almost no hope of 
making any headway into the Chinese 
domestic market without a partner. Of course 
this depends very much on the firm’s existing 
capabilities and relationships in the target 
market. The Mahindra Group’s entry into 
China via joint ventures is a case in point 
(refer to Box 2).
the silk Road ahead
While this article has focused largely on the 
challenges, opportunities and strategies 
that Indian companies can adopt to succeed 
in China, it is interesting to note that there 
are similar lessons emerging from the 
journeys of Chinese companies into India—
which we have outlined in our book. 
bOx 2: MAhINDRA & MAhINDRA GROuP
Mahindra Tractors, a unit of India’s Mahindra & Mahindra Group, took time to explore China’s marketplace 
before making a move. As a result, it is now the fifth largest tractor manufacturer in China, while selling 
240,000 tractors annually in more than 40 countries, with manufacturing operations in India, China, the U.S. 
and Australia. 
Mahindra’s first foray into China was to explore the potential for exporting tractors from India. They soon 
realised their Indian-made tractors were far too expensive, and the design was not compatible with Chinese 
farmers’ requirements. The only way they could compete would be to design and manufacture the vehicles 
locally. Instead of rushing in full tilt, they started small, forming a US$10 million, 80:20 joint venture with the 
financially troubled, state-owned enterprise, Jiangling Tractor Company (JTC). It didn’t take long before 
Mahindra identified areas of concern. The company’s manufacturing locations were far away from markets, 
there was a capacity constraint, and a majority of the dealers were ineffective. But all was not lost. For 
Mahindra, the JTC commitment had been a learning move, through which they were able to get people 
into China to study the market and figure out possible entry and follow-on strategies.
 
After four years, Mahindra felt ready to make a bigger move, and signed their second Chinese joint venture, 
this time with Jiangsu Yueda Yancheng Group, one of China’s top 100 business groups with revenues of 
about US$7 billion. In November 2009, another US$40 million was added to the venture to create an R&D 
centre and a new engine manufacturing plant. 
Above all, rapid learning 
and familiarisation is 
critical as is recognition 
that internally, India is far 
more diverse than 
China on a host of 
dimensions—income 
levels, language, 
religion, climate, and 
political leanings—and 
like China, India too is 
changing rapidly.
bOx 3: hAIER
Chinese home appliance multinational, Haier’s first push into the 
Indian market began in 1999 when it set up a joint venture with 
Hotline, a Kolkata-based company. Hotline Haier Alliances Ltd. ran into 
trouble from the very beginning as the partners differed profoundly in 
strategy. The move set Haier’s China plans back at least two years. By 
2003, the company’s management decided to go it alone, setting up 
Haier India as a wholly owned subsidiary, importing white goods from 
China and later Thailand. Later agreements saw it sourcing from Indian 
companies Whirlpool and Voltas, hoping to build up sales before 
starting its own manufacturing. The company focused on premium 
brands but in mid-2006 changed course to focus on rural India and 
the bottom-of-the-pyramid market. A year later they acquired their first 
company-owned manufacturing facility in India.
Like China, India too often suffers from 
not just unpredictable government policies, 
but also the fact that it is a low-income 
country open to players from every other 
country. Thus companies often face brutal 
competition and thin margins. Moreover, 
the Chinese find the chaos in India rather 
difficult to manage, as the new generation 
of Chinese in particular has not experienced 
such a lack of infrastructure. Yet if they are 
to have any hope of emerging as successful 
players over the next five to 10 years, they 
must make investments now, and see India 
as part of the company’s global strategy. 
They too must be very cautious and 
selective when entering into a joint venture, 
for joint ventures can be disastrous and 
costly, as the example of Haier shows (refer 
to Box 3).
Finally, Chinese companies must not 
forget that the media and the government 
in India are important stakeholders—and 
they have to build their trust with them. 
Above all, rapid learning and familiarisation 
is critical, as well as recognition that 
internally, India is equally or even more 
diverse than China on a host of dimensions—
income levels, language, religion, climate, 
and political leanings—and like China, India 
too is changing rapidly.
Chinese companies 
must not forget that 
the media and the 
government in India 
are important 
stakeholders—and 
they have to build their 
trust with them.
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Companies Are Becoming Stronger by Winning in 
Each Other’s Markets”; co-authored with Anil K. 
Gupta and Haiyan Wang.
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